Private Law: Trusts by LeVan, Gerald
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 33 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1971-1972 Term: A Symposium
Winter 1973
Private Law: Trusts
Gerald LeVan
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Gerald LeVan, Private Law: Trusts, 33 La. L. Rev. (1973)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol33/iss2/13
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deceased shareholder. It should make no difference under sec-
tion 55A whether the repurchase is a voluntary one or whether
it is pursuant to a contract as in the present case; the corpora-
tion may not prejudice corporate creditors by diverting funds
to redeem stock.
TRUSTS
Gerald Le Van*
The only decision of note dealing with private express trusts
was rendered by the Third Circuit in Harriss v. Concordia Bank
& Trust Co.,' where the beneficiary sought to terminate the trust
or alternatively to require invasion to the extent of $40,000 to
pay outstanding bills. Mrs. Harriss' husband had created a testa-
mentary trust over his entire estate, she being the beneficiary as
to one-fourth of both principal and interest. The other benefi-
ciaries were her children. As to her interest, the trust was to
continue for life, whereas the trust terminated as to the chil-
dren's interests when the youngest attained age 25.
Apparently, the principal trust property was a portfolio of
securities worth several hundred thousand dollars at the settlor's
death. The trust instrument permitted invasion of principal for
Mrs. Harriss' benefit in the trustees' "uncontrolled discretion...
in case of serious illness, surgical operation, or other grave emer-
gency." During the twelve-year period between her husband's
death and the institution of this suit, Mrs. Harriss suffered an
incredible series of personal, physical, mental, family, and finan-
cial disasters. On five different occasions, the trustee had invaded
principal on behalf of Mrs. Harriss in an aggregate amount of
some $165,000. Apparently, she had joined the trustee on each
occasion in obtaining a court order authorizing the invasion.
However, in this instance, it appears that the trustee neither
joined nor opposed her attempt to terminate the trust or alter-
natively to invade principal once again. At the time of trial, her
monthly trust income was approximately $800.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University and Assistant
Reporter for Louisiana Law Institute Committee for Continuing Revision of
the Louisiana Trust Code.
1. 265 So.2d 330 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972). The reader may also be inter-
ested in Bertrand v. Sandoz, 260 La. 239, 255 So.2d 754 (1971), which upholds
the constitutionality of the so-called "public trust" for the financing of pub-
lic improvements.
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It was argued that the trust should be terminated by the
court under authority granted in article 2026 of the Trust Codes
because the settlor could not and did not anticipate the enor-
mity of the problems which she faced. In rejecting this conten-
tion, the court pointed out the settlor's obvious purpose to sup-
port her from trust income for the remainder of her life which,
in its view, clearly anticipated future financial problems; further
invasion would reduce income below subsistence levels, thus
termination at this point would defeat the settlor's primary pur-
pose. The same view persuaded the court to disallow further
invasion.
The opinion does not state whether Mrs. Harriss' interest
was subject to spendthrift restraints. However, it is interesting
to note that her annual trust income of approximately $9,600 was
just below the maximum amount insulated from seizure by cred-
itors under article 2004 of the Trust Code.3
The trustee's posture in such a proceeding should be noted.
As to termination, he has the apparent duty to oppose it. As to
further invasion, however, his discretion is being challenged. In
some jurisdictions, the courts have adopted a very limited scope
of review over discretionary powers of the trustee. In essence,
judicial review is limited to alleged abuses of such powers, once
exercised.4 Moreover, the test of "abuse" is not the familiar
objective prudent man rule but rather the extent to which the
exercise of discretion accords with the settlor's intention, pru-
dence notwithstanding. By contrast, article 2115 of the Trust
Code 5 provides that trustee discretionary powers are not subject
to the control of the court except to prevent an abuse of discre-
tion. Perhaps both views are too narrow. The beneficiary should
be entitled to head off an outright abuse of discretion before it
2. "The proper court may order the termination or modification of a trust,
in whole or in part, if, owing to circumstances not known to a settlor and
not anticipated by him, the continuance of the trust unchanged would defeat
or substantially impair the purposes of the trust."
3. "(2) The portion of the net annual income in excess of the amount
that will give a beneficiary an aggregate net annual income of $10,000 from
all spendthrift trusts and from all other trusts under which alienation by
a beneficiary of his interest is restricted .... "
4. Watling v. Watling, 27 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOD)
OF TRuSTS, § 187 (1959).
5. "If discretion is conferred upon a trustee with respect to the exercise
of a power, its exercise shall not be subject to control by the court, except
to prevent an abuse of discretion by a trustee."
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occurs; by the same token, the court should have power to com-
pel the trustee to correct an abuse which has already occurred.
It is interesting that the court relies upon the settlor's inten-
tion as its standard, rather than the less subjective "prudent man
rule." In his respect, the decision accords with those in other
jurisdictions.
Huber v. Calcasieu Marine National Bank involved an
action against the trustee for alleged maladministration of an
inter vivos trust. The settlor of that trust died before the action
was brought, leaving her entire estate in two testamentary trusts,
one for the benefit of her only child, a son, and the other for the
benefit of his six children. It was alleged and sustained that the
action against the trustee of the inter vivos trust was an asset
of the estate of the settlor and thus became part of the trust
property of the testamentary trusts. It remained to determine
the proper parties plaintiff. Applying article 2222,7 the court
held that the trustee was the proper party plaintiff and sustained
an exception of no cause or right of action against the remaining
plaintiffs, who were beneficiaries of the testamentary trusts.
The result appears to be correct.
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
When the signature of the payee of a check is forged, cer-
tain well-settled consequences result: subsequent takers can-
not become holders in due course,1 and the drawee bank pays
6. 262 So.2d 404 (La. App. 8d Cir. 1972).
7. "A trustee is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of the trust
estate, except that a beneficiary may sue to enforce such a right, in order
to protect his own interest, in an action against:
"(1) A trustee and an obligor, if the trustee improperly refuses, neglects,
or is unable for any reason, to bring an action against the obligor; or
"(2) An obligor, if there is no trustee or the trustee cannot be subjected
to the jurisdiction of the proper court."
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Under R.S. 7:52, a holder in due course is said to be a "holder" who
has taken the instrument under the conditions therein prescribed. R.S.
7:191 defines "holder" as the payee or indorsee who is in possession of the
instrument, or the bearer thereof. But under R.S. 7:30, one becomes a
holder through the negotiation to him, in the case of order paper, by the
indorsement of the prior holder. Thus, the forger, not himself being a
"holder" cannot negotiate the instrument in such a manner that the taker
would be a holder, hence not a holder in due course. The same is true
with respect to subsequent transfers of the instrument bearing the forged
indorsement. See Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 124, 68 So.2d 781
(1953).
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